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Since a key function of competitive elections is to allow voters to express their policy preferences,
one might take it for granted that when leadership changes, policy change follows. Using a dataset
we created on the composition of central government expenditures in a panel of 71 democracies over
1972-2003, we test whether changes in leadership induce significant changes in spending composition,
as well as looking at the effect of other political and economic variables. We find that the replacement
of a leader tends to have no significant effect on expenditure composition in the short-run. This remains
true after controlling for a host of political and economic variables. However, over the medium-term
leadership changes are associated with larger changes in expenditure composition, mostly in developed
countries. We also find that in established democracies, election years are associated with larger changes
in expenditure composition while new democracies, which were found by Brender and Drazen (2005)















A  central  function  of  competitive  elections  is  to  allow  voters  to  express  their  policy 










the  composition  of  government  spending  may  well  be  representative  of  policy  change  in 
general. 




evidence  on  this  question  is  scarce  and  mixed.  As  far  as  we  know,  it  only  covers  OECD 
countries. 
The  question  of  whether  leadership  change  results  in  changes  in  the  composition  of 
























longer‐run  relationships,  where  we  do  find  an  effect  of  leadership  change  on  changes  in 
expenditure  composition.  Section  7  considers  election‐year  effects,  where  we  see  that  in 
established democracies, but not in new ones, election years are associated with larger changes 
in expenditure composition than non‐election years. In the final section we summarize our 































budget  distance  over  9  categories  with  a  similar  measure  to  ours  below
4  and  relate  it  to 
measures  of  the  ideological  distance  between  parties  in  the  government  as  well  as  the 
alternation of ideological position from one government to the next. They find that the change 
in the budget composition is related negatively to the ideological distance between parties in 
the  current  government  and  positively  to  the  ideological  differences  between  the  current 
government and the previous year's governments. As they put it, the budgetary structure tends 
to lock itself into the existing pattern in political systems with ideologically distant veto players; 









Bräuninger  (2005)  considers  the  ratio  of  social  security  expenditure  to  the  aggregate 




legislature  towards  more  left‐wing  parties  had  no  statistically  significant  effect  on  social 
spending. 
All these papers consider the relation between aspects of a government's ideology and 





















4 They use Euclidean distance     
½ 2
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That  is,  increased  deficits  and  expenditures  in  election  years  are  a  phenomenon  of  new 
democracies  and  are  not  statistically  significant  in  developed  countries  or  established 
democracies as a group. The findings in Brender and Drazen (2008) suggest why this may be the 
case  –  election‐year  deficits  or  increases  in  overall  expenditure  significantly  decrease  the 
probability of reelection in established democracies and developed countries as a group, but 
have no statistically significant effect in developing countries or new democracies in either 







6  Drazen  and  Eslava  (2009)  find  further  that  this  composition  shift  increases  an 
incumbent's reelection probabilities. To the best of our knowledge there is no large panel study 































or  she  takes  office.
7  Even  when  there  are  no  legal  constraints  in  changing  policy,  new 
officeholders  may  face  a  learning  curve  in  how  to  achieve  their  aims.  This  suggests  that 




smaller  than  underlying  ideological  differences  between  leaders  may  suggest.  The  basic 
Downsian model of purely office‐motivated candidates who can commit to policy platforms 
implies  that  under  certain  conditions  the  policy  platforms  of  both  candidates  in  a  two‐






















Conceptually,  one  may  argue  that  there  is  a  price  to  pay  to  change  expenditure 
composition (which may be close to infinite on some issues at some points) which must be 
weighed against the gain. More precisely, the questions of whether a new leader wants to 
















cost  of  effecting  change,  while  the  electoral  motive  may  imply  a  large  perceived  payoff. 
Moreover, shifting expenditures may be less visible than deficits and may also be perceived by 
































expenditure (where ej,i,t  is between 0 and 100 so that  100 , , 1  

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Observations 1 year 2 years 4 years 1 year 2 years 4 years
Total 1010 912 705 867 779 603
Developed 551 510 423 455 427 362
Undeveloped 459 402 282 412 352 241
New Democracies 322 273 164 277 227 132
Established Democracies 688 639 541 590 552 471
Presidential 317 278 196 278 237 163
Parliamentary 693 634 509 589 542 440
Majoritarian 212 186 147 207 181 144
Proportional 798 726 558 660 598 459
1 For definitions of the country categories see the data appendix.
9 Expenditure Categories 12 Expenditure Categories




















1 year in EY
2
2 years in EY
2
4 years in EY
2
Replaced Leader 254 152 230 138 178 110
No change in alignment 151 73 134 64 100 50
Change from Left to All 33 26 32 25 25 20
of which to Right 26 22 25 21 20 17
Change from Right to All 42 35 38 32 33 27
of which to Left 28 24 26 22 21 17
Change from Center or Undefined to all 28 18 26 17 20 13
1 year in EY
2
2 years in EY
2
4 years in EY
2
Replaced Leader 210 131 188 118 144 95
No change in alignment 118 60 104 53 74 41
Change from Left to All 29 24 27 22 25 20
of which to Right 23 20 21 18 20 17
Change from Right to All 38 32 34 29 29 24
of which to Left 26 23 24 21 19 16
Change from Center or Undefined to all 25 15 23 14 16 10
2 EY stands for election year.
9 Expenditure Categories
12 Expenditure Categories
1Relating to a change in the base year, e.g., in the 2 years category we report whether there had been a 
leadership change in t-2.



























political  variables ‐ ‐ on  changes  in  government  expenditure  composition  we  run  a  panel 
regression with country fixed effects: 
 t t t s s
s
t i cx b n I     , , z  


























1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years
mean 4.473 6.317 7.747 7.926 5.144 7.105 8.577 8.754
stdev 3.890 4.778 5.764 5.030 4.352 5.185 6.089 5.431
Expenditure Growth 
2 mean 4.459 8.732 13.300 17.769 4.503 8.761 13.141 17.503
stdev 8.777 13.962 17.960 20.125 9.081 14.429 18.705 20.818
GDP Per Capita Growth 
3 mean 2.317 4.643 7.149 10.120 2.297 4.544 6.921 9.790
stdev 3.236 5.290 7.115 8.247 3.255 5.271 7.110 8.197
GDP Per Capita  
4 mean 12.027 12.416 12.790 13.820 11.451 11.996 12.368 13.640
stdev 9.604 9.569 9.595 9.412 9.249 9.267 9.268 9.187
Average Inflation 
5 mean 0.240 0.298 0.259 0.122 0.264 0.327 0.284 0.125
stdev 1.062 1.520 1.109 0.202 1.143 1.633 1.193 0.209
Population over 65 
6 mean 10.587 10.716 10.820 11.284 10.147 10.317 10.424 10.990
stdev 4.269 4.219 4.182 3.963 4.240 4.199 4.186 3.998
Presidential Votes 
7 mean 0.438 0.447 0.446 0.428 0.440 0.454 0.455 0.437
stdev 0.190 0.176 0.170 0.171 0.196 0.179 0.175 0.182
mean 0.384 0.386 0.388 0.390 0.396 0.398 0.401 0.402
stdev 0.186 0.181 0.176 0.164 0.182 0.176 0.170 0.157
* For detailed information on the construction of the variables see the data appendix.
8 Only for observations in Parliamentary systems: The percentage of seats in the parliament held by the current leader's party.
3 The total percentage growth of GDP Per Capita during the period.
4 The level of GDP per capita in thousands of $US in the last year of each period.
5 Average annual inflation during the period (1=100% average annual inflation).
6 The percentage of the population over age 65 in the last year of each sample.
7 Only for observations in Presidential systems: The percentage of the votes received by the current president in the first 
round of the most recent presidential elections.
12 Expenditure Categories
1 The percentage change in Expenditure Composition within 9 or 12 categories during the period.
2 The total real (inflation adjusted) percentage growth of central government expenditure during the period.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables*
Change in Expenditure 
Composition 
1





























Level and change in per-capita GDP 
Changes  in  the  composition  of  expenditures  may  be  affected  by  both  the  level  of 
development and the rate of economic growth. Poorer countries may be more constrained in 
what  government  spending  finances,  while  higher  income  allows  more  choices  and  hence 



















observations  that  are  defined  as  war  years  this  variable  had  no  effect  on  expenditure 
composition due to the use of the country fixed effects.
11 










number  of  other  political  variables  may  also  influence  changes  in  the  composition  of 
government expenditure. 
Electoral systems 
The  extent  of  change  in  composition  of  government  expenditure  may  differ  in 
majoritarian  versus  proportional  electoral  systems.  The  first  is  often  associated  with  fewer 
parties and majority governments, the second with more parties and coalition governments. A 
simple proportional system can be thought of as having a single district, as opposed to many 
geographically‐determined  districts  in  a  majoritarian  system.  Numerous  papers
12  argue 
theoretically  that  a  proportional  system  tilts  the  composition  of  public  spending  towards 





welfare  programs.  Persson  and  Tabellini  (2004)  argue  that  much  larger  district  size  (often 
national districts) in proportional systems give parties strong incentives to seek support from 
broad coalitions in the population. In contrast, in majoritarian elections conducted in smaller 
districts,  politicians  target  smaller,  but  pivotal,  geographical  constituencies.  They  find  that 







government  expenditure  of  having  a  presidential  versus  a  parliamentary  system  of 
government, though it has primarily been concerned with its effect on the size, rather than on 






























replaced  by  other  political  (democratic)  or  exogenous  mechanisms  (such  as  death  of  the 
incumbent leader).  
5.1 Short‐term effects – basic lack of effect 























1 Cat9_1 -0.128 00 1010 71 0.378
[0.603] 00
2 Cat9_1 -0.135 0 0.018 1010 71 0.379
[0.581] 0 [0.456]
3 Cat9_1 0 -0.558* 0 1010 71 0.380
0 [0.052] 0
4 Cat9_1 0 -0.561** 0.019 1010 71 0.382
0 [0.048] [0.445]
5 Cat12_1 -0.234 00 867 68 0.438
[0.406] 00
6 Cat12_1 -0.242 0 0.028 867 68 0.441
[0.386] 0 [0.296]
7 Cat12_1 0 -0.514 0 867 68 0.439
0 [0.122] 0
8 Cat12_1 0 -0.52 0.028 867 68 0.442
0 [0.112] [0.288]
9 Cat9_2 -0.205 00 912 70 0.459
[0.466] 00
10 Cat9_2 -0.205 0 0.002 912 70 0.459
[0.466] 0 [0.869]
11 Cat9_2 0 -0.113 0 912 70 0.459
0 [0.741] 0
12 Cat9_2 0 -0.115 0.003 912 70 0.459
0 [0.737] [0.829]
13 Cat12_2 -0.279 00 779 65 0.507
[0.387] 00
14 Cat12_2 -0.284 0 0.015 779 65 0.508
[0.376] 0 [0.352]
15 Cat12_2 0 -0.244 0 779 65 0.505
0 [0.523] 0
16 Cat12_2 0 -0.261 0.015 779 65 0.507
0 [0.490] [0.339]
Table 4 - Leadership Change Effects on Expenditure Composition: 1-2 years*
* P values are in the parantheses.
 The equations also included controls for cases where there was an additional 





In  the  U.S.,  for  example,  mandatory  spending  (synonymous  in  the  budget  with  “direct 
spending”)  generally  includes  all  spending  that  is  made  pursuant  to  laws  other  than 
appropriations laws, so that its fundamental characteristic is the lack of annual discretion to 
establish  spending  levels  (unless  the  law  is  changed).  Entitlement  spending  (a  subset  of 
mandatory  spending),  such  as  Social  Security,  Medicare,  and  Medicaid  in  the  U.S.  and 







replaced  relative  to  years  of  no  leader  replacement.
























expenditure,  while  higher  per‐capita  GDP  growth  lowers  it  although  this  effect  is  not 
statistically significant at the "noisier" Cat9_1 series). These effects are similar in magnitude, so 
that  changes  in  the  composition  of  government  expenditure  increase  only  when  overall 
























Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2
12345678
Economic variables
Expenditure growth (1% =1)
1 0.049** 0.072*** 0.031** 0.050*** 0.050** 0.072*** 0.033** 0.050***
[0.033] [0.003] [0.040] [0.001] [0.032] [0.003] [0.033] [0.001]
GDP per-capita growth (1% =1)
1 -0.062 -0.092* -0.056* -0.104*** -0.065 -0.091* -0.058* -0.103***
[0.155] [0.063] [0.068] [0.002] [0.132] [0.060] [0.055] [0.002]
GDP per-capita (in 000's of $US) 0.007 0.056 -0.006 0.059 0.001 0.054 -0.015 0.050
[0.857] [0.195] [0.908] [0.302] [0.981] [0.219] [0.763] [0.383]
Average inflation (100% inflation=1) 1.860*** 2.288*** 1.944*** 2.148*** 1.859*** 2.294*** 1.954*** 2.157***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Average inflation squared -0.096*** -0.118*** -0.070*** -0.078*** -0.096*** -0.118*** -0.070*** -0.078***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Expenditure Composition
2
Defense share  -0.053 -0.064 -0.075 -0.125 -0.057 -0.066 -0.080 -0.130*
[0.463] [0.415] [0.272] [0.103] [0.430] [0.402] [0.245] [0.091]
Defense share * Developed 
3 -0.019 0.131 0.043 0.293** -0.021 0.130 0.034 0.279**
[0.864] [0.245] [0.724] [0.021] [0.848] [0.246] [0.778] [0.026]
Education share * Less Developed 
3 -0.242*** -0.256** -0.335*** -0.476*** -0.242*** -0.258** -0.329*** -0.472***
[0.005] [0.016] [0.005] [0.000] [0.005] [0.015] [0.006] [0.000]
Social protection share -0.066** -0.077** -0.058 -0.069 -0.065** -0.076** -0.057 -0.069
[0.027] [0.030] [0.159] [0.144] [0.029] [0.032] [0.167] [0.149]
Political Characteristics
Government size (% of GDP) 0.048** 0.085*** 0.070** 0.111*** 0.048** 0.085*** 0.072** 0.115***
[0.043] [0.002] [0.022] [0.002] [0.042] [0.002] [0.020] [0.002]
New democracy 2.016** 2.297** 2.129** 2.348** 1.972** 2.281** 2.085** 2.372**
[0.012] [0.014] [0.027] [0.039] [0.014] [0.015] [0.030] [0.039]
Presidential -1.982*** -1.653** -2.819** -3.557** -1.994*** -1.633** -2.772** -3.457**
[0.004] [0.034] [0.010] [0.038] [0.004] [0.038] [0.011] [0.045]
Majoritarian -0.343 -0.309 0.566 -0.402 -0.314 -0.260 0.615 -0.292
[0.675] [0.695] [0.554] [0.696] [0.700] [0.740] [0.518] [0.775]
Majoritarian and new democracy -3.584** -4.006** -5.545*** -7.240*** -3.583** -4.014** -5.580*** -7.297***
[0.018] [0.016] [0.002] [0.000] [0.017] [0.015] [0.002] [0.000]
Leader Characteristics
Replaced leader 
4 -0.170 -0.245 -0.300 -0.376 -0.604** -0.545* -0.275 -0.481
[0.484] [0.368] [0.258] [0.204] [0.028] [0.077] [0.415] [0.179]
Constant 6.638*** 5.275*** 8.217*** 8.077*** 6.806*** 5.288*** 8.315*** 8.038***
[0.000] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000]
Number of observations 969 856 887 773 969 856 887 773
Number of countries 69 66 68 63 69 66 68 63
R-Squared 0.455 0.526 0.545 0.603 0.458 0.527 0.545 0.602
Adjusted R-Squared 0.404 0.477 0.497 0.558 0.406 0.478 0.498 0.556
1 Total growth during the period.
4 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced (in an election year, in columns 5-8) in the base year.
2 The percent of government spending on the respective category in the base year (1% share=1). 
3 The percent of government spending in the base year on the respective category multiplied by a binary variable for developed or less 
developed countries.
Table 5 - Leadership Change Effects on Expenditure Composition: 1-2 years Including Economic and 
Political Controls.*
Replaced Leader Replaced Leader in Election Year
*P values are in the parantheses. The equations also included controls for cases where there was an additional leadership change in t-1 






expenditure  composition,  suggesting  that  larger  overall  expenditure  gives  the  government 
more freedom in changing composition. We can only venture some guesses on why this might 
be the case. Small governments may be concentrated on more basic, central functions, giving 













Third,  turning  to  the  political  structure,  we  find  no  statistically  significant  difference 
between  majoritarian and  proportional  systems  in  the  amount  of  expenditure composition 
change. However, we do find a significant effect of having a presidential system rather than a 
parliamentary  one.  Even  though  one  might  have  expected  that  presidents  may have  more 
ability to reallocate expenditures if they so desire, we find the contrary result: presidential 
systems are characterized by smaller changes in expenditure composition. We should note that 
our  results  may  complement  those  of  Persson  and  Tabellini  discussed  above.  Their  work 
considers  the  relation  between  electoral  system  and  spending  composition  (over  broad 










(measured  in  terms  of standard  deviations  from  the  sample  mean) doesn’t  matter  for  the 
extant of changes in expenditure composition.
18 As for the political orientation of the leader, 




















presidential  and  parliamentary  systems.  Nevertheless,  even  in  such  specifications  the  interactions  of  political 
strength with replaced leader have a negative sign (although not always statistically significant). 




Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2
12345678
Economic variables
Expenditure Growth (1% =1)
1 0.047** 0.070*** 0.031** 0.052*** 0.047** 0.070*** 0.033** 0.052***
[0.045] [0.004] [0.047] [0.001] [0.045] [0.004] [0.031] [0.001]
GDP per-capita growth (1% =1)
1 -0.058 -0.089* -0.046 -0.092*** -0.063 -0.091* -0.050* -0.091***
[0.180] [0.070] [0.121] [0.004] [0.145] [0.062] [0.089] [0.004]
GDP per-capita (in 000's of USD) 0.005 0.056 -0.009 0.066 0.001 0.055 -0.008 0.057
[0.892] [0.194] [0.908] [0.234] [0.985] [0.209] [0.863] [0.308]
Average inflation (100% inflation=1) 1.840*** 2.270*** 1.973*** 2.128*** 1.837*** 2.268*** 1.959*** 2.108***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Average inflation squared -0.094*** -0.115*** -0.072*** -0.078*** -0.095*** -0.117*** -0.070*** -0.077***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Expenditure Composition
2
Defense share  -0.038 -0.046 -0.052 -0.105 -0.042 -0.049 -0.055 -0.110
[0.615] [0.568] [0.460] [0.180] [0.569] [0.542] [0.437] [0.159]
Defense share * Developed 
3 -0.040 0.114 0.028 0.294** -0.042 0.111 0.011 0.274**
[0.713] [0.314] [0.814] [0.019] [0.694] [0.326] [0.926] [0.029]
Education share * Less Developed 
3 -0.242*** -0.257** -0.331*** -0.474*** -0.243*** -0.261** -0.329*** -0.474***
[0.005] [0.014] [0.006] [0.000] [0.005] [0.013] [0.006] [0.000]
Social protection share -0.066** -0.077** -0.063 -0.077 -0.066** -0.076** -0.062 -0.077
[0.029] [0.035] [0.125] [0.109] [0.029] [0.035] [0.134] [0.112]
Political Characteristics
Government Size (% of GDP) 0.040* 0.078*** 0.056* 0.096*** 0.040* 0.079*** 0.059* 0.100***
[0.099] [0.005] [0.079] [0.010] [0.099] [0.004] [0.066] [0.007]
New Democracy 1.943** 2.279** 2.039** 2.179* 1.919** 2.289** 2.023** 2.228*
[0.016] [0.015] [0.033] [0.057] [0.018] [0.016] [0.035] [0.053]
Presidential -1.803** -1.264 -2.562** -3.443** -1.796** -1.241 -2.507** -3.377**
[0.015] [0.139] [0.023] [0.044] [0.015] [0.144] [0.025] [0.048]
Majoritarian -0.323 -0.289 0.853 -0.102 -0.296 -0.247 0.907 -0.026
[0.697] [0.719] [0.366] [0.918] [0.719] [0.755] [0.334] [0.979]
Majoritarian and New Democracy -3.378** -3.875** -4.967*** -6.294*** -3.368** -3.856** -4.910*** -6.375***
[0.025] [0.019] [0.005] [0.002] [0.024] [0.018] [0.006] [0.002]
Leader Characteristics
Replaced leader 
4 -0.139 -0.078 -0.158 0.007 -0.475 -0.217 0.196 -0.055
[0.630] [0.796] [0.622] [0.983] [0.135] [0.544] [0.682] [0.899]
Vote_pres * Replaced Leader
5 -0.193 -0.368 -0.584 -0.946** -0.453 -0.724 -0.728* -0.764*
[0.622] [0.379] [0.111] [0.015] [0.265] [0.103] [0.087] [0.071]
Party_parl * Replaced Leader
5 0.189 -0.043 0.426 0.113 0.254 0.020 -0.370 -0.156
[0.566] [0.892] [0.301] [0.800] [0.451] [0.953] [0.487] [0.747]
Vote_pres -0.159 -0.245 0.143 0.555 -0.125 -0.216 0.158 0.469
[0.631] [0.528] [0.727] [0.241] [0.713] [0.585] [0.698] [0.324]
Party strength_parl 0.079 0.191 0.358 0.677* 0.084 0.178 0.562 0.726**
[0.755] [0.463] [0.326] [0.082] [0.716] [0.465] [0.112] [0.046]
leader from right or center 0.545** 0.282 0.850*** 0.671** 0.536** 0.272 0.828*** 0.648**
[0.023] [0.254] [0.002] [0.024] [0.025] [0.272] [0.004] [0.032]
Constant 6.570*** 5.131*** 7.769*** 7.501*** 6.723*** 5.161*** 7.763*** 7.550***
[0.000] [0.006] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.006] [0.000] [0.001]
Number of observations 969 856 887 773 969 856 887 773
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 6 96 66 86 36 96 66 86 3
R-Squared 0.459 0.529 0.553 0.611 0.463 0.531 0.552 0.608
Adjusted R-Squared 0.404 0.476 0.503 0.564 0.408 0.479 0.503 0.561
1 Total growth during the period.
3 The percent of government spending in the base year on the respective category multiplied by a binary variable for developed or less 
developed countries.
5 An interaction between the share of votes received by the president in a presidential system (the largest party's share of seats in 
parliament in a parliamentary system) and the variable "replaced leader".
Table 6 - Leadership Change Effects on Expenditure Composition: 1-2 years Including Economic and 
Political Controls and Leader Characteristics.*
Replaced Leader Replaced Leader in Election Year
*P values are in the parantheses. The equations also included controls for cases where there was an additional leadership change in t-1 
or in t. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
2 The percent of government spending on the respective category in the base year (1% share=1). 
4 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced (in an election year, in columns 5-8) in the base year.25 
 
 
Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2
12345678
Economic variables
Expenditure growth (1% =1)
1 0.011 0.079** 0.040 0.102*** 0.056** 0.074** 0.032 0.060***
[0.838] [0.043] [0.226] [0.000] [0.036] [0.013] [0.104] [0.002]
GDP per-capita growth (1% =1)
1 0.003 0.003 -0.053 -0.068* -0.121* -0.158** -0.055 -0.121**
[0.957] [0.965] [0.191] [0.082] [0.054] [0.029] [0.218] [0.015]
GDP per-capita (in 000's of USD) 0.017 0.070 0.016 0.102** -0.419 -0.187 -0.268 0.324
[0.708] [0.101] [0.750] [0.045] [0.175] [0.727] [0.413] [0.568]
Average inflation (100% inflation=1) 0.836 -1.801 2.960 2.493 1.690*** 2.011*** 1.580*** 1.605***
[0.790] [0.593] [0.502] [0.625] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Average inflation squared 1.618 5.438 2.934 4.948 -0.088*** -0.105*** -0.058*** -0.059***
[0.715] [0.241] [0.593] [0.417] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Expenditure Composition
2
Defense share -0.026 0.098 0.011 0.228*** -0.099 -0.086 -0.115 -0.155
[0.711] [0.141] [0.904] [0.004] [0.238] [0.443] [0.188] [0.173]
Education share 0.013 0.032 -0.092 -0.176* -0.227** -0.230** -0.268** -0.384***
[0.856] [0.700] [0.298] [0.093] [0.012] [0.036] [0.038] [0.008]
Social Protection share -0.056 -0.046 0.011 0.032 -0.059 -0.093 -0.191*** -0.299***
[0.112] [0.307] [0.819] [0.592] [0.352] [0.221] [0.006] [0.000]
Agriculture share 0.000 0.149 0.000 0.137 0.000 -0.012 0.000 -0.131
0.000 [0.236] 0.000 [0.415] 0.000 [0.903] 0.000 [0.203]
Political Characteristics
Government size (% of GDP) 0.045* 0.072*** 0.067** 0.104*** 0.025 0.101 0.034 0.132
[0.085] [0.009] [0.044] [0.006] [0.687] [0.214] [0.661] [0.172]
New democracy 0.525 1.465 1.940 3.182 2.417** 2.891** 1.661 2.221*
[0.714] [0.346] [0.254] [0.106] [0.030] [0.012] [0.157] [0.100]
Majoritarian 0.043 -0.212 0.547 -0.139 -0.790 -0.030 1.485 -0.538
[0.961] [0.820] [0.587] [0.897] [0.701] [0.987] [0.585] [0.862]
Majoritarian and new democracy 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -3.773** -4.480** -5.034*** -6.066***
[.] [.] [.] [.] [0.019] [0.010] [0.007] [0.005]
Presidential -0.169 0.000 -0.174 0.000 -1.223 -0.724 -2.312 -3.297
[0.896] [.] [0.892] [.] [0.290] [0.498] [0.243] [0.156]
Leader Characteristics
Replaced leader in EY
3 -0.498* -0.266 0.209 0.180 -0.035 0.186 -0.073 -0.208
[0.060] [0.307] [0.643] [0.676] [0.962] [0.832] [0.923] [0.815]
Vote_pres * Replaced leader in EY
4 -0.010 0.071 0.011 -0.242 -1.409* -1.871** -1.194 -1.455*
[0.948] [0.554] [0.977] [0.187] [0.051] [0.020] [0.108] [0.052]
Party_parl * Replaced leader in EY
4 0.136 -0.029 -0.104 0.299 0.142 -0.120 -0.448 -0.869
[0.651] [0.919] [0.848] [0.475] [0.816] [0.847] [0.492] [0.211]
Vote_pres -0.441* -0.173 -0.356 -0.003 0.031 -0.147 0.476 0.757
[0.084] [0.689] [0.205] [0.993] [0.947] [0.774] [0.420] [0.264]
Party strength_parl -0.026 0.150 0.047 0.212 0.173 0.255 1.051 1.472*
[0.908] [0.469] [0.877] [0.457] [0.666] [0.598] [0.140] [0.053]
Constant 3.203 -0.584 1.563 -3.318 11.647*** 9.666* 17.174*** 18.628***
[0.159] [0.828] [0.553] [0.313] [0.003] [0.086] [0.000] [0.001]
Number of observations 524 453 493 426 445 403 394 347
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 2 42 22 42 24 54 44 44 1
R-Squared 0.229 0.321 0.262 0.391 0.390 0.427 0.493 0.527
Adjusted R-Squared 0.164 0.257 0.193 0.327 0.289 0.321 0.397 0.425
1 Total growth during the period.
2 The percent of government spending on the respective category in the base year (1% share=1). 
4 An interaction between the share of votes received by the president in a presidential system (the largest party's share of seats in 
parliament in a parliamentary system) and the variable "Replaced Leader in EY".
Table 7: Leadership Change Effects on Expenditure Composition in Developed and Less Developed 
Countries: 1-2 years*
Developed Less Developed
*P values are in the parantheses. The equations also included controls for cases where there was an additional leadership change in t-1 
or in t. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level, respectively.













in  developed  countries,  while  disappearing  entirely  in  less‐developed  ones.  As  already 



















Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2
12345678
-0.346 -0.425 0.051 -0.201 -0.328 -0.318 0.560 0.122
[0.306] [0.245] [0.901] [0.661] [0.373] [0.419] [0.242] [0.808]
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.016 -0.197 -0.786 -0.667
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.983] [0.804] [0.242] [0.354]
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.034 -0.111 -0.640 -0.262
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.936] [0.790] [0.283] [0.692]
Replaced leader in EY 
1 -0.592** -0.538* -0.275 -0.484 -0.596** -0.559* -0.262 -0.462
[0.032] [0.081] [0.414] [0.174] [0.031] [0.071] [0.438] [0.195]
Leader change from Left to Right -0.074 0.489 -0.367 -0.271 -0.302 -0.807 0.345 -0.071
[0.884] [0.581] [0.512] [0.691] [0.710] [0.416] [0.747] [0.951]
Leader change from Right to Left -0.818 -1.100* 0.310 0.216 -1.248 -1.975 1.732 1.712
[0.115] [0.080] [0.677] [0.818] [0.315] [0.143] [0.395] [0.488]
0.272 1.516* -0.869 -0.254
[0.706] [0.082] [0.336] [0.803]
0.496 1.038 -1.644 -1.711
[0.670] [0.400] [0.368] [0.432]
Replaced leader in EY 
1 -0.590** -0.537* -0.323 -0.553 0.029 -0.201 0.225 0.200
[0.042] [0.097] [0.347] [0.121] [0.954] [0.722] [0.684] [0.740]
Number of Parties in Government  0.148 0.116 0.150 0.085 0.202* 0.149 0.199 0.161
[0.130] [0.285] [0.213] [0.525] [0.062] [0.235] [0.138] [0.291]
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.253 -0.141 -0.226 -0.317*
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.115] [0.449] [0.212] [0.087]
Replaced leader in EY 
1 -0.573** -0.526* -0.335 -0.571 -0.594** -0.554* -0.188 -0.394
[0.044] [0.098] [0.331] [0.110] [0.032] [0.066] [0.609] [0.292]
Presidential control
3 0.214 0.228 0.989 1.232* 0.183 0.185 1.189* 1.485*
[0.697] [0.724] [0.114] [0.085] [0.754] [0.789] [0.082] [0.059]
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.106 0.136 -0.700 -0.822
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.878] [0.861] [0.330] [0.292]
Table 8: Political Effects on the Relationship Between Leadership Change and Expenditure Composition 
Change*
*P values are in the parantheses. The equations also included controls for cases where there was an additional leadership change in t-1 
or in t, and the economic, expenditure composition and political variables that appear in Table 5. The regressions in the first box also 
include the share of votes received by the president in a presidential system and the largest party's share of seats in parliament in a 
parliamentary system. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Vote_pres * Replaced leader with 
different alignment in EY
2
Party_parl * Replaced leader with 
different alignment in EY
2
Replaced leader with different 
alignment in EY
1
Largest Government party change 
from Left to Right
Largest Government party change 
from Right to Left
Presidential control * Replaced 
leader in EY
Number of Parties in Government * 
Replaced leader in EY
3 A binary variable with a value of 1 in a presidential system when the president's party is the largest party in government and in 
parliament.
1 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced in elections (with a leader of a different alignment in the first box) in 
the base year.
2 An interaction between the share of votes received by the president in a presidential system (the largest party's share of seats in 






was  a  change  in  leader  herself),  provided  the  ideological  distance  between  parties  in  the 
government is not too great. The difference in results may reflect their use of a much smaller 









































Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2
12345678
Leader Characteristics
Replaced leader in EY
1 -0.424* -0.341 0.006 0.223 -0.194 -0.158 0.104 0.120
[0.076] [0.151] [0.988] [0.596] [0.390] [0.500] [0.762] [0.734]
Party_parl * Replaced leader in EY
2 -0.232 -0.227 -0.020 -0.067 -0.244 -0.233 -0.158 -0.216
[0.285] [0.346] [0.953] [0.851] [0.240] [0.320] [0.576] [0.484]
leader from right or center 0.367 0.011 0.834** 0.264 0.260 0.215 0.666** 0.642**
[0.152] [0.964] [0.021] [0.442] [0.226] [0.345] [0.027] [0.034]
Vote_pres -0.081 0.000 -0.255** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.492] [.] [0.028] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.]
Party strength_parl 0.071 0.138 0.189 0.347 0.181 0.186 0.235 0.363
[0.679] [0.453] [0.412] [0.164] [0.287] [0.316] [0.275] [0.133]
Constant 2.153*** 1.734** 0.343 2.611** 1.965** 1.472* -0.133 1.816
[0.006] [0.044] [0.877] [0.026] [0.012] [0.089] [0.954] [0.106]
Number of observations 468 396 436 374 405 361 383 343
Number of countries 19 18 19 18 15 15 15 15
R-Squared 0.186 0.220 0.222 0.251 0.159 0.230 0.208 0.283
Adjusted R-Squared 0.126 0.158 0.158 0.186 0.104 0.173 0.150 0.224
‡ Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom
2 An interaction between the largest party's share of seats in parliament in a parliamentary system and the variable "replaced leader in 
EY".
† Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom
Table 9 - Leadership Change Effects on Expenditure Composition: 1-2 years in Selected OECD countries*
*P values are in the parantheses. The equations also included controls for cases where there was an additional leadership change in t-1 
or in t and the economic and political variables variables that appear in Table 5. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 
10 percent level, respectively.
Tsebelis & Chang 19 
† OECD 15
‡
1 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced in an election year in the base year.
 




covariates  are  very  similar  to  what  is  reported  in  the  earlier  tables.  Full  results  are  on 







Yet  another  possibility  is  that  leaders  raise  expenditures  as  a  mechanism  to  facilitate 






Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2
12345678
Leader Characteristics
Replaced leader in EY
1 -0.542* -0.355 0.194 -0.008 -0.597** -0.531* -0.218 -0.356
[0.083] [0.324] [0.680] [0.985] [0.036] [0.099] [0.518] [0.328]
Vote_pres_Replaced Leader in EY
2 -0.402 -0.613 -0.712 -0.761* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.340] [0.190] [0.101] [0.079] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Party_parl_Replaced Leader in EY
2 0.419 0.323 -0.220 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.199] [0.361] [0.677] [0.910] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
leader from right or center 0.511** 0.232 0.743** 0.532* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.038] [0.360] [0.010] [0.084] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Vote_pres -0.262 -0.435 0.106 0.344 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.456] [0.292] [0.806] [0.505] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Party strength_parl 0.029 0.112 0.519 0.669* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.902] [0.657] [0.153] [0.074] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Constant 6.515*** 5.565*** 9.044*** 9.844*** 6.713*** 5.809*** 9.737*** 10.429***
[0.000] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000]
Number of observations 969 856 887 773 969 856 887 773
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 6 96 66 86 36 96 66 86 3
R-Squared 0.452 0.515 0.552 0.604 0.447 0.510 0.545 0.598
Adjusted R-Squared 0.397 0.461 0.502 0.557 0.395 0.459 0.498 0.553
2 An interaction between the share of votes received by the president in a presidential system (the largest party's share of seats in 
parliament in a parliamentary system) and the variable "replaced leader".
Table 10: Leadership Change Effects on Expenditure Composition over 1-2 years, without Controlling for 
Expenditure Growth
*P values are in the parantheses. The equations also included control for cases where there was an additional leadership change in t-1 or 
in t and the economic and political variables that appear in Table 5. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent 
level, respectively.















there  had  been  a  successive  leadership  change  during  the  period).  We  find  that  over  this 





















1 Cat9_4 0.415 00 705 55 0.489
[0.284] 00
2 Cat9_4 0.446 0 0.041*** 705 55 0.507
[0.236] 0 [0.000]
3 Cat9_4 0 0.48 0 705 55 0.490
0 [0.283] 0
4 Cat9_4 0 0.459 0.041*** 705 55 0.508
0 [0.291] [0.000]
5 Cat12_4 0.849* 00 603 51 0.563
[0.063] 00
6 Cat12_4 0.957** 0 0.056*** 603 51 0.593
[0.029] 0 [0.000]
7 Cat12_4 0 1.082** 0 603 51 0.565
0 [0.034] 0
8 Cat12_4 0 1.073** 0.055*** 603 51 0.594
0 [0.029] [0.000]
Table 11 - Leadership Change Effects on Expenditure Composition: 4 years*
* P values are in the parantheses. The equations also included controls for cases where there was an 
additional leadership during the covered period. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 
10 percent level, respectively.
1 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced in the base year.
2 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced in the base year, and that year was 

















1 0.061*** 0.076*** 0.057*** 0.076***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
GDP per-capita growth 
1 -0.051* -0.069** -0.053** -0.068**
[0.053] [0.014] [0.046] [0.017]
GDP per-capita (in 000's of USD) 0.162** 0.165** 0.158** 0.161**
[0.011] [0.028] [0.012] [0.035]
Average Inflation (100% inflation=1) 10.577*** 9.070*** 10.096*** 9.143***
[0.000] [0.006] [0.000] [0.005]
Average Inflation squared -4.811*** -4.163** -4.538*** -4.180**
[0.002] [0.019] [0.002] [0.018]
Expenditure Composition
2
Defense share * Less Developed
3 -0.124 -0.126 -0.084 -0.128
[0.171] [0.202] [0.356] [0.222]
Defense share * Developed
3 0.292** 0.471*** 0.279** 0.479***
[0.017] [0.000] [0.021] [0.000]
Social Protection share  -0.072 -0.040 -0.071 -0.039
[0.130] [0.439] [0.135] [0.450]
Education share * Less Developed
3 -0.303 -0.553** -0.284 -0.559**
[0.185] [0.035] [0.218] [0.036]
Political Characteristics
Government Size (% of GDP) 0.115** 0.129** 0.110** 0.125**
[0.014] [0.017] [0.019] [0.023]
New Democracy 2.309* 1.057 2.312* 1.002
[0.080] [0.431] [0.067] [0.469]
Majoritarian -0.940 -1.205 -0.873 -1.138
[0.323] [0.208] [0.361] [0.231]
Majoritarian and New Democracy -7.214*** -8.618*** -7.411*** -8.378***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Presidential 0.000 0.000 0.965 -0.042
0.000 0.000 [0.452] [0.980]
Leader Characteristics
Replaced leader 
4 0.263 0.739* 0.285 0.739*
[0.480] [0.078] [0.441] [0.079]
Vote_pres 0.000 0.000 -0.978** 0.147
0.000 0.000 [0.023] [0.830]
Party strength_parl 0.000 0.000 0.103 0.297
0.000 0.000 [0.791] [0.440]
Constant 3.264 3.568 3.415 3.547
[0.272] [0.271] [0.258] [0.297]
Number of observations 698 600 698 600
Number of countries 55 51 55 51
R-Squared 0.576 0.657 0.580 0.658
Adjusted R-Squared 0.527 0.613 0.530 0.612
1 Total growth during the period (1% growth=1).
Table 12: Leadership Change Effects on Expenditure Composition: 4 years 
Including Economic and Political Controls.*
* P values are in the parantheses.
 The equations included controls for cases where there was an 
additional leadership change during the covered period. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 1,5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
4 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced in the base year.
3 The percent of government spending in the base year on the respective category multiplied by a 
binary variable for developed or less developed countries.
Replaced Leader








1 1.008** 1.085** 0.827* 1.003**
[0.015] [0.024] [0.071] [0.034]
Vote_pres 0.013 -0.453 0.045 -0.463*
[0.937] [0.122] [0.815] [0.089]
Party strength_parl -0.174 0.255 -0.145 0.267
[0.620] [0.433] [0.673] [0.410]
Constant -4.424 -1.397 -4.756 -1.857
[0.167] [0.461] [0.148] [0.356]
Number of observations 423 362 423 362
Number of countries 22 20 22 20
R-Squared 0.338 0.442 0.343 0.436
Adjusted R-Squared 0.278 0.389 0.284 0.384
1 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced (in an election year in columns 3-
4) in the base year.
* P values are in the parantheses.
 The equations include the controls that appear in Table 12. *,** and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Table 13: Leadership Change and Political Strength Effects on Expenditure 
Composition in 4 years Periods - Developed Countries.* 
Replaced Leader















year  dummy  to  our  earlier  one‐year  regressions.  There  is  still  no  direct  effect  of  replaced 
leader,  as  before.  We  find  however  that  election  years  in  established  democracies  are 










Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_1 Cat12_1
1234 5 678
Economic variables
Expenditure Growth (1% growth=1)
1 0.069*** 0.079*** 0.000 0.000 0.070*** 0.080*** 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] 0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] 0.000 0.000
Political Characteristics
New Democracy 2.278*** 2.869*** 2.165*** 2.673*** 2.285*** 2.914*** 2.158** 2.700***
[0.006] [0.001] [0.010] [0.002] [0.006] [0.001] [0.011] [0.002]
Leader Characteristics
Election Year and New Democracy -0.923** -0.602 -0.856* -0.582 -0.862* -0.613 -0.800 -0.601
[0.035] [0.250] [0.058] [0.289] [0.070] [0.276] [0.104] [0.307]
Election Year and Established Democracy 0.634** 0.779** 0.634** 0.777** 0.704** 0.780** 0.696** 0.773**
[0.022] [0.011] [0.023] [0.012] [0.030] [0.024] [0.035] [0.029]
Election year in t+1 0.209 0.015 0.229 0.053 0.133 -0.018 0.147 0.020
[0.368] [0.952] [0.323] [0.830] [0.578] [0.942] [0.537] [0.936]
Replaced leader 
2 -0.025 0.021 -0.095 -0.073 -0.154 0.090 -0.265 -0.051
[0.928] [0.941] [0.737] [0.797] [0.583] [0.788] [0.368] [0.883]
Vote_pres_Replaced Leader
3 -0.216 -0.366 -0.152 -0.272 -0.599 -0.820* -0.516 -0.698
[0.587] [0.386] [0.704] [0.519] [0.129] [0.061] [0.218] [0.132]
Party_parl_Replaced Leader
3 0.158 -0.021 0.370 0.237 0.039 -0.073 0.324 0.285
[0.629] [0.947] [0.275] [0.478] [0.891] [0.823] [0.297] [0.416]
Vote_pres -0.244 -0.208 -0.450 -0.470 -0.204 -0.183 -0.404 -0.435
[0.462] [0.595] [0.189] [0.242] [0.549] [0.645] [0.247] [0.284]
Party strength_parl 0.026 0.158 -0.042 0.071 0.058 0.162 0.002 0.092
[0.916] [0.547] [0.867] [0.786] [0.796] [0.503] [0.992] [0.704]
Constant 4.382*** 3.229* 5.602*** 4.814*** 4.494*** 3.225* 5.723*** 4.804***
[0.001] [0.053] [0.000] [0.008] [0.001] [0.054] [0.000] [0.009]
Number of observations 966 850 966 850 966 850 966 850
Number of countries 69 66 69 66 69 66 69 66
R-Squared 0.487 0.539 0.470 0.520 0.490 0.542 0.473 0.522
Adjusted R-Squared 0.433 0.486 0.415 0.464 0.436 0.488 0.418 0.467
1 Total growth during the period.
2 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced (in an election year in columns 5-8) in the base year.
Table 14: Election Year Effects on Expenditure Composition*
3 An interaction between the share of votes received by the president in a presidential system (the largest party's share of seats in parliament in 
a parliamentary system) and the variable "replaced leader".
*P values are in the parantheses. The equations also included controls for cases where there was an additional leadership change in t-1 or in t 
and the economic and political variables variables that appear in Table 5. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent 
level, respectively.










examine  whether  the  initial  political  strength  of  the  incumbent  is  associated  with  the 
magnitude of change in composition during election years; we find no evidence for such an 



















Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_1 Cat12_1
12345678
Box 1
Election Year in Established Democracy
2 0.521* 0.514* 0.643** 0.635** 0.542* 0.512* 0.604* 0.570*
[0.055] [0.057] [0.031] [0.032] [0.075] [0.088] [0.062] [0.072]
Election Year in New Democracy
2 -0.939** -0.874* -0.661 -0.628 -0.908* -0.864* -0.689 -0.683
[0.036] [0.055] [0.222] [0.261] [0.062] [0.081] [0.238] [0.254]
Presidential Control
3 0.219 0.207 0.273 0.233 0.189 0.176 0.261 0.221
[0.701] [0.721] [0.685] [0.735] [0.740] [0.761] [0.699] [0.749]
Presidential Control * Election Year -0.453 -0.467 -0.753 -0.713 -0.255 -0.252 -0.676 -0.630
[0.484] [0.486] [0.308] [0.356] [0.693] [0.707] [0.363] [0.417]
Box 2
Election Year in Established Democracy
2 0.619** 0.631** 0.725** 0.730** 0.679** 0.678** 0.718** 0.708**
[0.028] [0.027] [0.017] [0.018] [0.041] [0.045] [0.041] [0.049]
Election Year in New Democracy
2 -0.945* -0.817 -0.786 -0.741 -0.885 -0.773 -0.771 -0.746
[0.065] [0.118] [0.214] [0.254] [0.107] [0.168] [0.251] [0.278]
Presidential * Election Year 0.139 0.070 0.457 0.454 0.137 0.074 0.432 0.436
[0.800] [0.901] [0.526] [0.542] [0.803] [0.895] [0.549] [0.559]
Box 3
Election Year in Established Democracy
2 0.582* 0.625** 0.737** 0.795** 0.640* 0.673* 0.720* 0.767**
[0.054] [0.043] [0.032] [0.025] [0.063] [0.059] [0.054] [0.049]
Election Year in New Democracy
2 -0.912** -0.791* -0.586 -0.510 -0.854* -0.745 -0.590 -0.529
[0.035] [0.074] [0.260] [0.348] [0.068] [0.122] [0.290] [0.362]
Majoritarian * Election Year 0.254 0.073 0.219 0.013 0.244 0.066 0.218 0.015
[0.609] [0.883] [0.666] [0.980] [0.618] [0.894] [0.664] [0.977]
Box 4
Election Year in Established Democracy
2 0.542* 0.549* 0.698** 0.707** 0.632* 0.625* 0.716** 0.711*
[0.055] [0.056] [0.027] [0.028] [0.059] [0.067] [0.045] [0.052]
Election Year in New Democracy
2 -0.991** -0.911** -0.701 -0.674 -0.904* -0.837* -0.678 -0.667
[0.027] [0.047] [0.183] [0.222] [0.062] [0.094] [0.232] [0.260]
Vote_pres * Election Year -0.343 -0.335 -0.633* -0.644* -0.246 -0.232 -0.607* -0.619*
[0.273] [0.305] [0.056] [0.057] [0.425] [0.474] [0.063] [0.065]
Party_parl * Election Year -0.225 -0.165 -0.082 0.008 -0.139 -0.079 -0.050 0.032
[0.329] [0.512] [0.750] [0.978] [0.544] [0.754] [0.848] [0.909]
2 An interaction between binary variables indicating whether the observation is an election year and whether the country belongs to the relavant category.
Table 15: Election Year Effects on Changes in Expenditure Composition - Political Characteristics
*P values are in the parantheses. The equations also included controls for cases where there was an additional leadership change in t, and the economic and 
political variables that appear in Table 5. The regressions in Box 4 also include the share of votes received by the president in a presidential system (the 
largest party's share of seats in parliament in a parliamentary system). *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
3 A binary variable with a value of 1 in a presidential system when the president's party is the largest party in government and in parliament.
Replaced Leader Replaced Leader in Election Year
Exp. Growth
1 No Exp. Growth
1 Exp. Growth
1 No Exp. Growth
1
1 Indicares whether the eqaution included a control for expenditure growth.
 
8. Conclusions 




























































































































Leaders  1945‐2008  (http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/00index2.htm)  and  World  Statesmen 
(http://www.worldstatesmen.org/).  Leader  identification  is  based  on  the  Presidential  variable, 
described below. In presidential systems the leader is the president and in parliamentary systems the 
leader is the prime‐minister. 
Information  on  election  dates  was  collected  from  the  Institute  for  Democracy  and  Electoral 
Assistance  (IDEA)  dataset
23  "Voter  Turnout  Since  1945"  and  supplemented  by  data  from  the  ERA 
(Election  Results  Archive)  (http://cdp.binghamton.edu/era/)  and  the  CIA's  "World  Factbook".
24  In 
















fiscal  years.  For  example,  in  Canada  the  fiscal  year  starts  on  April  1













several  of  the  expenditure  categories  we  use.  In  order  to  calculate  the  changes  in  expenditure 

















































x - x - 0 0 100 * 2 / ) TXP /  (EXP_i - ) TXP /  (EXP_i
i
 
Cat9_x =  100 * 2 / ) TXP /  (EXP_i - ) TXP /  (EXP_i
9
1












For developed countries we implemented a stricter restriction of Cat9_1 &   Cat12_1<18 which is 
about 6 times the sample average (Table A‐3). 
 








































VOTE ‐  the  percent  of  votes  for  the  current  president  in  the  first  round  of  the  most  recent 









































































































We calculate EXP_gr_X as follows = 100 * 1
100
INF
1 )/ /TXP (TXP
0
X - 1 i
i









































































government  and  opposition  and  provides  aggregate  information  regarding  all  other  parties  in 
government and opposition. 











Table A-1: Data Sources





IFS International Monetary 
Fund
2006 central government total expenditure 




GFS International Monetary 
Fund
2006 central government total expenditure, 





WDI The World Bank 2005 GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$, 






2003 Level of Democracy index 1800-2003
Database of Political 
Institutions
DPI The World Bank 2004 political system, term limits, election 
results and the allocation of seats in 
parliament, election system, political 
alignment.
1975-2004
Voter Turnout Since 1945 to 
Date
IDEA Institute for 
Democracy and 
Current election years, election results 1945-2006




Current election years, election results, 
election dates
1974-2004
Electionguide.org IFES International 
Foundation for 
Current election dates 1998-2005
World Political Leaders ZPC Zárate's Political 
Collections
Current leaders' names, dates of accession 
and their party association
1945-2008
The World Factbook CIA Central Intelligence 
Agency
Current election dates, frequency of elections 
in a country, political system
1960-2008
Worldstatesmen.org Ben M. Cahoon Current leaders' names, dates of accession, 




1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years
Change in Expenditure Composition 7 9 4 1 5 7 3 0
Change in GDP Per Capita 3 9 7 9 3 9 7 9
Average Inflation  5 - - 14 4 - - 14
9 Expenditure Categories 12 Expenditure Categories
* The listed limitations are cumulative, therefore the number of observations dropped in each line assumes that 
observations that fail a previous constraint had already been dropped.
Table A-2: Numbers of Observations Dropped by Variable Limitation and Dataset *
 
 
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years
All Countries mean  4.473 6.317 7.747 7.926 5.144 7.105 8.577 8.754
stdev 3.890 4.778 5.764 5.030 4.352 5.185 6.089 5.431
Developed mean 2.958 4.267 5.370 5.811 3.196 4.664 5.672 6.256
stdev 2.602 2.943 3.824 3.511 2.446 3.085 3.410 3.417
Undeveloped mean 6.292 8.966 10.917 11.099 7.294 10.065 12.311 12.507
stdev 4.373 5.132 6.364 5.295 4.945 5.657 6.712 5.734
New Democracies mean  6.124 8.968 10.925 10.741 6.990 9.990 12.290 12.235
stdev 4.362 5.326 6.559 5.442 4.852 5.730 6.805 6.120
Established Democracies mean  3.701 5.330 6.506 7.073 4.277 5.918 7.179 7.779
stdev 3.385 3.964 4.895 4.572 3.802 4.433 5.150 4.795
Presidential mean 6.195 9.105 11.135 11.201 7.293 10.154 12.591 12.706
stdev 4.434 5.281 6.675 5.490 5.044 5.736 6.955 5.980
Parliamentary mean 3.686 5.204 6.294 6.665 4.129 5.771 6.856 7.290
stdev 3.333 3.870 4.624 4.214 3.562 4.296 4.735 4.394
Majoritarian mean 4.225 5.703 6.604 6.854 4.797 6.479 7.143 7.449
stdev 3.597 4.325 4.485 3.498 4.221 4.992 4.686 3.740
Proportional mean 4.539 6.599 8.030 8.209 5.252 7.294 8.992 9.164
stdev 3.964 4.793 6.007 5.328 4.389 5.231 6.381 5.805
9 Expenditure Categories 12 Expenditure Categories
1 The percentage change in Expenditure Composition within 9 or 12 categories during the period.
Table A-3: Descriptive Statistics of the Change in Expenditure Composition by Country 
Characteristics*
* For detailed information on the construction of the variables and definitions of country characteristics see the data 
appendix.





Table A-4: Majoritarian New Democracies in the Sample
Cat9_1 Cat9_2 Cat9_3 Cat9_4
Bangaladesh 2002-2003 2003 --
Chile 2002-2003 2003 --
Ethiopia 1996-1999 1997-1999 1998-1999 -
Iran 1998-2001 1999-2001 2000-2001 -
Malaysia 1973-1978 1974-1978 1975-1978 1976-1978
Mauritius 1981-1982 1982 - -
Mongolia 1993-1994, 1996-1998, 2001-2002 1994, 1997-1998, 2002  1997-1998 -
Nepal 1998-2001 1999-2001 2000-2001 2001
Thailand 1975, 1979-1990 1980-1988 1981-1988 1982-1989
Cat12_1 Cat12_2 Cat12_3 Cat12_4
Bangaladesh 2002-2003 2003 --
Chile 2002-2003 2003 --
Ethiopia 1996-1999 1997-1999 1998-1999 -
Iran 1998-2000 1999-2000 2000 -
Malaysia 1974-1975, 1978 1975, 1977 1977-1978 1977-1978
Mauritius 1981-1982 1982 - -
Mongolia 1993-1994, 1996-1998, 2001-2002 1994, 1997-1998, 2002  1997-1998 -
Nepal 1998-2001 1999-2001 2000-2001 2001
Thailand 1975, 1979-1990 1980-1988 1981-1988 1982-1989
9 Categories
12 Categories
 